review-pr

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands and subprocesses, including git, gh (GitHub CLI), glab (GitLab CLI), and jq to manage repository state and interact with remote platforms.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The common.sh utility script uses eval within the load_kv_output function to import variables generated by other scripts. While printf %q is used to escape values, the use of eval on dynamically constructed strings is a risky pattern.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The normalize_path function in common.sh performs runtime script generation and execution by passing a heredoc to python3 for path normalization tasks.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external sources and acts upon it.
  • Ingestion points: Fetches pull request comments and discussion threads via scripts/fetch_review_comments.sh; parses repository-level policy files (AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md) in scripts/repo_policy.sh.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands were found in the processing logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to modify local git state, manage worktrees, and post comments to remote APIs using scripts/worktree_sync.sh and scripts/post_review_comment.sh.
  • Sanitization: Employs jq for JSON data and printf %q for shell variable escaping, though repository policy parsing relies on regular expressions which may be bypassed.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with well-known services (GitHub and GitLab) to fetch pull request metadata and comments. These operations use official CLI tools and require existing user authentication.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 13, 2026, 02:24 PM