secondme-external-skill-catalog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves skill definitions and metadata from the vendor's server to populate a catalog.
- Evidence: Requests are made to
https://app.mindos.com/gate/in/rest/third-party-agent/v1/skills/availableandhttps://app.mindos.com/gate/in/rest/third-party-agent/v1/skills/{skillKey}. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs local file system operations to install the downloaded bundles into the agent's environment.
- Evidence: The skill creates directories and writes files (such as
SKILL.md,prompt.md, andprompt_short.md) based on the content received from thegeneratedSkillFilesfield in the API response. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses a local file to retrieve authentication credentials necessary for communicating with the vendor's API.
- Evidence: It reads
{baseDir}/.credentialsto obtain anaccessToken. This is a sensitive file path, but the access is consistent with the skill's primary function and targets the vendor's own infrastructure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill installs external prompts and metadata which could potentially contain instructions that influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
generatedSkillFilesfrom theapp.mindos.comAPI. - Boundary markers: None present; the skill preserves server-provided file contents exactly.
- Capability inventory: File-write operations to the local skill root.
- Sanitization: No sanitization is performed as the skill is designed to mirror the server's content exactly.
Audit Metadata