secondme-init

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 22, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The skill explicitly prompts the user for a Client Secret and a Database URL (which typically contains a username and password). These secrets are then written in plain text to .secondme/state.json on the local filesystem.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE] (HIGH): The workflow includes reading and displaying the contents of .secondme/state.json, which contains sensitive credentials. If this skill is used in a shared or logged environment, these secrets could be exposed in the conversation history.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted user input (App Info and App Name) and interpolates it into CLAUDE.md. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface where a malicious payload in the metadata could influence an agent's behavior when it later reads the project documentation.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided App Info text and manual input fields.
  • Boundary markers: None identified for the generated CLAUDE.md file.
  • Capability inventory: File system write operations for configuration and documentation.
  • Sanitization: None identified; user input is directly mapped to the configuration and documentation fields.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 22, 2026, 10:25 AM