anachb

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): All provided shell scripts (search.sh, departures.sh, route.sh, disruptions.sh) are vulnerable to arbitrary shell command injection due to unsafe interpolation of user-controlled variables.
  • Evidence: In search.sh, the variable $QUERY is interpolated as '"$QUERY"' within the curl -d argument. Because the variable is expanded outside of the single-quoted string, a payload like '; touch /tmp/pwned # will terminate the curl command and execute the injected command.
  • Impact: An attacker can execute any command with the privileges of the agent process.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The command injection vulnerability enables the execution of remote code by allowing an attacker to use curl or wget to download and run malicious scripts.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): Through command injection, an attacker can access sensitive environment variables, system files (e.g., /etc/passwd), or cloud metadata, and exfiltrate them to an external server.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Category 8: The skill ingests untrusted external data from the HAFAS API which could contain malicious instructions designed to override agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: search.sh, departures.sh, route.sh, and disruptions.sh all retrieve data from https://vao.demo.hafas.de/gate.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. The raw API output is processed by jq and returned to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess execution (curl, jq).
  • Sanitization: None. Data from the API (such as station names or disruption messages) is passed directly into the agent's context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 09:18 AM