apple-mail

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script uses sqlite3 to query the local Apple Mail 'Envelope Index' database. While it implements basic single-quote escaping for search filters (e.g., --from, --subject), it does not use fully parameterized queries, which is a common pattern for local CLI tools but poses a minor risk if inputs are not strictly controlled.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from external emails (subject lines, bodies, and attachments) which are then presented to the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Reads email metadata, summaries, and raw RFC822 content from ~/Library/Mail via apple-mail.sh (commands search, info, read).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the script output or tool definitions to separate email content from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can perform local file reads (read), directory listing (mailboxes), and file extraction to /tmp (attachment).
  • Sanitization: The script performs basic SQL escaping but does not sanitize the content of the emails themselves before they are processed by the LLM.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill explicitly targets sensitive user data (personal emails and attachments). While this is the stated primary purpose of the skill, it creates a high-value target for exfiltration if the agent is subsequently compromised or tricked by malicious email content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 11:18 AM