google-workspace
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/workspace.jsutilizes thenode:vmmodule to execute arbitrary JavaScript code passed via stdin or command-line arguments. While this enables flexible API interactions, it allows the agent to execute dynamic logic within the local environment with access to theauthandworkspaceobjects. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/common.jsfile includes a functioninstallDependenciesthat automatically executesnpm installif the required packages (googleapis,@google-cloud/local-auth) are missing. This occurs at runtime without explicit user confirmation during the first execution. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In the default 'cloud' authentication mode, the skill transmits OAuth refresh tokens to
https://google-workspace-extension.geminicli.com/refreshTokento perform token renewals. This makes the external domain a trusted party in the authentication flow. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from external sources like Gmail messages and Google Drive files, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled through
workspace.callorworkspace.servicecalls withinscripts/workspace.jsto Gmail and Drive APIs. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to differentiate between data content and control instructions in the retrieved payloads.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities to read, write, and delete data across various Google Workspace services (Gmail, Drive, Calendar, Docs, etc.).
- Sanitization: Content retrieved from APIs is returned to the agent context in its raw format without sanitization or filtering.
Audit Metadata