oebb-scotty
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): Multiple shell scripts (
arrivals.sh,departures.sh,search-station.sh,trip.sh) construct JSON payloads forcurlby concatenating shell variables directly into the JSON string (e.g.,'"$STATION"'). This allows an attacker to inject malicious JSON fields to manipulate the API request, although it does not directly lead to shell command execution due to double-quoting of the variable expansion. - CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (LOW): The skill hardcodes an
aid(Access ID)"OWDL4fE4ixNiPBBm"inSKILL.mdand all bash scripts. While this is a known public ID used by the ÖBB web application, hardcoding authentication tokens is a poor security practice. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Fetches untrusted data (station names, directions, and disruption alerts) from the ÖBB HAFAS API in all five scripts.
- Boundary markers: Absent; the raw or filtered API output is passed directly to the agent context.
- Capability inventory: Includes network operations via
curland structured data processing viajq. - Sanitization:
disruptions.shperforms basic HTML tag stripping usingjq, but no other scripts sanitize the API response content.
Audit Metadata