migrate-oai-app
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Remote Code Execution] (CRITICAL): The skill directs the agent to execute
npm installandnpm run startwithin a repository cloned fromgithub.com/modelcontextprotocol/ext-apps. As the repository organization is not on the trusted list, this enables arbitrary code execution from an untrusted source via package scripts.\n- [External Downloads] (HIGH): The skill usesgit cloneto download external code to the/tmpdirectory without verifying the integrity or origin of the code.\n- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill directs the agent to read external files with significant execution capabilities. Ingestion points:/tmp/mcp-ext-apps/docs/and/tmp/mcp-ext-apps/src/. Boundary markers: None provided to separate external content from instructions. Capability inventory:npm install,npm run build,npm run start,git clone. Sanitization: None detected. This surface allows an attacker to control agent behavior via malicious documentation or source code comments.\n- [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The use of shell command substitution$(npm view ...)to determine version tags is a vector for command injection if the registry metadata or the package name is compromised.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata