agency
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a complex multi-agent pipeline (Planner -> Copywriter -> Designer -> Builder -> Evaluator -> Learner) where data flows between specialized components. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The system processes untrusted data at multiple stages, including initial user requests ($ARGUMENTS), generated BRIEF documents, and outputs like copy, design specs, and code files.
- Boundary markers: The orchestration instructions lack explicit delimiters or isolation protocols to prevent downstream agents from inadvertently following instructions embedded within the data they are processing.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator and its sub-agents have access to powerful tools including
Write,Edit, andBash, which could be exploited if an agent is compromised via indirect injection. - Sanitization: No evidence of content sanitization or validation is described as data moves between the pipeline stages.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator manages specialized agents that perform functional code generation and execution.
- The 'builder' agent produces code based on design specs, which is then processed by the 'evaluator' agent.
- The 'evaluator' agent uses Playwright to run tests, which involves the execution of dynamically generated code and scripts in the local environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
evolvesubcommand implements a self-modification feature that updates the instructions of agents and skills located in.claude/agents/agency/and.claude/skills/agency-*/based on feedback logs. - This represents dynamic instruction generation and persistence of locally-generated logic.
- Mitigation: The risk is mitigated by a mandatory human-in-the-loop checkpoint (
AskUserQuestion) where the user must preview and approve the proposed changes before they are applied to the system.
Audit Metadata