moai-design-tools

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The documentation in reference/figma.md and reference/pencil-renderer.md instructs the setup of MCP servers using npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-figma and npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-pencil. These packages are downloaded from a remote registry at runtime.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The use of npx to execute remote packages without version pinning or integrity verification constitutes remote code execution. The @modelcontextprotocol organization is not included in the predefined trusted source list, making these unverified dependencies.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill explicitly requests Bash permissions in SKILL.md. While intended for developer workflows, this capability can be leveraged to execute arbitrary system commands if the agent is compromised or misled.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Fetches design metadata, component descriptions, and DNA codes from external Figma and Pencil files via MCP tools.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore commands embedded within the design data.
  • Capability inventory: Includes Bash, Write, Edit, and WebFetch, which could be exploited by malicious instructions hidden in design files.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for the fetched design context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 23, 2026, 06:18 AM