moai-workflow-project
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data to influence agent behavior and output. 1. Ingestion points: Data enters through user responses in
templates/question-templates/and via project-level files scanned for language and metadata. 2. Boundary markers: Markdown templates such astemplates/doc-templates/product-template.mduse direct variable interpolation without explicit delimiters to isolate user-provided content. 3. Capability inventory: The skill documentation describes capabilities likelocalize_agent_promptsand automated documentation generation from specification data. 4. Sanitization: Structural validation is present inschemas/config-schema.json, but there is no evidence of sanitization for the content interpolated into prompts. - [Unverifiable Dependencies] (LOW): The project initialization configuration includes an
auto_dependenciesoption which triggers package managers likepipandnpm. This is a standard but noteworthy supply chain risk surface. - [Dynamic Execution] (LOW): The system supports template engines like Jinja2 and Handlebars. Un-sandboxed processing of user-controlled data remains a potential vector for injection if the
check_securityfeatures in the schema are not properly enforced.
Audit Metadata