doc-vault-project
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands using variables derived from user input or note content, which presents a risk of command injection if parameters are not properly sanitized.
- Evidence: The
initcommand usesmkdir -p "$VAULT/projects/{slug}/..."where{slug}is derived from a user-provided project name. - Evidence: The
linkandpromotecommands useqmd vsearch "{project topic}"where the search string is based on user input. - Evidence: The
statuscommand executesls "$VAULT/projects/"to list directory contents. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes data from existing notes within the Obsidian vault to generate status reports and update index files.
- Ingestion points: File
SKILL.mddescribes workflows forstatus,add, andlinkwhich involve reading_index.mdand component note frontmatter. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions provided to the agent to treat note content as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
mkdir,ls,qmd), write files ("Write tool"), and modify existing note structures. - Sanitization: Partial. While the instructions advise the agent to convert names to kebab-case slugs, there is no explicit sanitization for the content of notes being read and interpreted.
Audit Metadata