doc-vault-project

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands using variables derived from user input or note content, which presents a risk of command injection if parameters are not properly sanitized.
  • Evidence: The init command uses mkdir -p "$VAULT/projects/{slug}/..." where {slug} is derived from a user-provided project name.
  • Evidence: The link and promote commands use qmd vsearch "{project topic}" where the search string is based on user input.
  • Evidence: The status command executes ls "$VAULT/projects/" to list directory contents.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes data from existing notes within the Obsidian vault to generate status reports and update index files.
  • Ingestion points: File SKILL.md describes workflows for status, add, and link which involve reading _index.md and component note frontmatter.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions provided to the agent to treat note content as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (mkdir, ls, qmd), write files ("Write tool"), and modify existing note structures.
  • Sanitization: Partial. While the instructions advise the agent to convert names to kebab-case slugs, there is no explicit sanitization for the content of notes being read and interpreted.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 10:29 AM