skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/analyzing-persistence-mechanisms-in-linux/Gen Agent Trust Hub
analyzing-persistence-mechanisms-in-linux
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses multiple sensitive system paths to identify persistence markers, including
/etc/crontab,/var/spool/cron/,/etc/ld.so.preload, and.ssh/authorized_keys. Although this access is intended for auditing, these files contain high-value configuration and user information. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/agent.pyusessubprocess.runto execute several local system commands for enumeration, such ascrontab -l,dpkg -S, andenv. It also executes a shell loop viabash -cto iterate through all system users and extract their crontab entries. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from the filesystem.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/agent.pyreads untrusted strings from user crontabs, shell profiles (.bashrc,.profile), and systemd service units. - Boundary markers: Absent; the script does not wrap ingested system data in delimiters or provide 'ignore instructions' warnings before processing.
- Capability inventory: The agent operates with root/sudo privileges and has capabilities for subprocess execution, file system access, and report generation.
- Sanitization: Absent; while the script uses regex for detection, it does not sanitize or escape the content of the ingested files before including them in the final JSON report.
Audit Metadata