analyzing-persistence-mechanisms-in-linux

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses multiple sensitive system paths to identify persistence markers, including /etc/crontab, /var/spool/cron/, /etc/ld.so.preload, and .ssh/authorized_keys. Although this access is intended for auditing, these files contain high-value configuration and user information.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/agent.py uses subprocess.run to execute several local system commands for enumeration, such as crontab -l, dpkg -S, and env. It also executes a shell loop via bash -c to iterate through all system users and extract their crontab entries.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from the filesystem.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/agent.py reads untrusted strings from user crontabs, shell profiles (.bashrc, .profile), and systemd service units.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the script does not wrap ingested system data in delimiters or provide 'ignore instructions' warnings before processing.
  • Capability inventory: The agent operates with root/sudo privileges and has capabilities for subprocess execution, file system access, and report generation.
  • Sanitization: Absent; while the script uses regex for detection, it does not sanitize or escape the content of the ingested files before including them in the final JSON report.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 15, 2026, 03:56 PM