conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

• Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes explicit credential examples (e.g., domain.admin:'Password123') and instructs extracting hashes (KRBTGT, NTLM) and embedding them verbatim into commands/tools (mimikatz, secretsdump, ticketer), which requires the LLM to handle and output secret values directly.

CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

• Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). This content is explicit offensive guidance that instructs how to obtain DCSync replication rights, extract KRBTGT and other account hashes, forge Golden Tickets, and grant replication/backdoor rights—actions that directly enable credential theft, persistent domain compromise, and privilege escalation.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

• Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt explicitly instructs active exploitation and state-changing actions—running credential-dumping tools (Mimikatz, secretsdump), extracting KRBTGT hashes, forging Golden Tickets, and modifying AD ACLs/granting DCSync rights to create persistent backdoors—thereby directing the agent to manipulate and compromise system/domain state.