skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/configuring-suricata-for-network-monitoring/Gen Agent Trust Hub
configuring-suricata-for-network-monitoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation and implementation rely heavily on administrative commands via
sudo. This includes package installation (apt), kernel repository management (add-apt-repository), network interface configuration (ethtool,ip link), and service management (systemctl). While these are necessary for deploying a network security tool, they grant the skill significant control over the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow involves downloading Suricata source code from the official Open Information Security Foundation (OISF) GitHub repository and fetching security rules from Emerging Threats and other repositories using the
suricata-updatetool. These are well-known and reputable sources within the cybersecurity community. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
scripts/agent.pycomponent parses network logs (eve.json) which contain untrusted data from the network (e.g., DNS queries, TLS SNI values, and HTTP headers). This represents an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points:
scripts/agent.pyreads and parseseve.jsonin functionsparse_eve_alerts,parse_eve_dns, andparse_eve_tls. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing the log data.
- Capability inventory:
scripts/agent.pyhas the capability to execute system commands usingsubprocess.run(e.g.,suricata,suricata-update). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the extracted fields before they are returned as part of the report. An attacker could potentially embed malicious instructions in network traffic that, when logged and subsequently processed by an AI agent, might influence the agent's reasoning.
Audit Metadata