skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/performing-hash-cracking-with-hashcat/Gen Agent Trust Hub
performing-hash-cracking-with-hashcat
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Automated execution of the
hashcatutility.\n - Evidence:
scripts/agent.pyusessubprocess.runto execute the system binary.\n - Context: It correctly passes arguments as a list, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Generation of command-line strings for manual execution.\n
- Evidence:
scripts/process.pyprovides agenerate_hashcat_commandfunction that returns a joined string of command arguments.\n - Context: Users should be aware that executing these strings in a shell requires input sanitization if source filenames are untrusted.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Access to sensitive cryptographic material.\n
- Evidence: The scripts read and parse files containing hashes and cracked passwords (potfiles).\n
- Evidence:
scripts/agent.pywrites output to the temporary directory at/tmp/hashcat_out.txt.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: References to official security tools and wordlists.\n - Evidence:
references/standards.mdlinks to official GitHub repositories for Hashcat and common wordlists like SecLists.\n - Context: These are well-known resources in the cybersecurity community and are considered safe sources.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerability to indirect instruction injection through processed data.\n
- Ingestion points: Hash files and potfiles read by
scripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.py.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the scripts parse file lines directly without explicit instruction-filtering delimiters.\n
- Capability inventory: Capability to execute subprocesses (
agent.py) and write files (process.py).\n - Sanitization: Basic validation using regex patterns for hash identification.
Audit Metadata