skills/nanomicon/skills/tilth/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tilth

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative language such as "MANDATORY" and "Use tilth instead of read, grep, find, cat" to coerce the agent into overriding its standard, safety-hardened tools with a custom utility. This is a form of behavioral instruction overriding.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is centered around executing the tilth CLI tool with various arguments, including the ability to read any file on the system or map entire directory structures. This represents a significant capability for interacting with the host environment.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: While not a standalone category in the schema, the documentation explicitly lists reading dotfiles (e.g., .env) as a capability. This presents a risk of sensitive data exposure if the agent is directed to explore a codebase that contains hardcoded secrets or configuration files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The tool is designed to ingest and summarize large volumes of external code and text. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in source code, comments, or documentation could be processed by the agent during its analysis of a repository.
  • [CAPABILITY_INVENTORY]:
  • Ingestion points: tilth <path> (file read), tilth <symbol> (AST-based search), tilth --map (directory traversal).
  • Boundary markers: None specified in the prompt instructions to isolate external content.
  • Capability inventory: File system read, directory mapping, and potential file modification via the mentioned --edit mode.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of file content before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 15, 2026, 07:03 AM