skills/naohainezha/skill/screenshot/Gen Agent Trust Hub

screenshot

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (HIGH): The skill programmatically captures the user's entire screen or specific windows and saves them to /tmp. These screenshots can contain highly sensitive information, including visible credentials, private communications, or financial data, which are then read into the agent's context and could be exfiltrated.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The agent ingests untrusted visual data from the screenshot. If a malicious instruction is displayed on the screen (e.g., via a website, email, or document), the agent might execute it. Given the skill's 'Bash' capability, this could lead to unauthorized system modifications or data theft.
  • Ingestion points: Reads captured image data from /tmp/alma-screenshot-thumb.jpg.
  • Boundary markers: None. The agent treats visual information as raw context.
  • Capability inventory: Uses the Bash tool to execute screencapture and sips. The presence of the Bash tool itself allows for broader exploitation if an injection occurs.
  • Sanitization: None. The skill captures raw screen state without filtering.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): While the skill uses specific paths for system binaries (/usr/sbin/screencapture, /usr/bin/sips), the combination of executing commands based on visual state and having general 'Bash' tool access increases the risk profile significantly.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 06:53 AM