url-content-loading

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill uses uvx kabigon to download and run a package from an external registry. The kabigon package is not from a source within the trusted scope, posing a risk of supply chain attack or execution of unvetted code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands (uvx kabigon ...) which involve running external code on the host system. This capability can be abused if the agent is manipulated into executing different flags or commands.
  • [INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION] (HIGH): The core purpose of the skill is to ingest data from untrusted external sources like social media, GitHub, and general web pages.
  • Ingestion points: Multiple loaders (Playwright, YouTube, Twitter, Reddit, GitHub) fetch content from attacker-controlled or public third-party URLs.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks any instruction to delimit the loaded content or warn the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill enables the agent to process external data which, if passed to other tools (like file-write or code-exec), could lead to a full system compromise via instructions hidden in a YouTube transcript or a GitHub README.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering to remove potential prompt injection payloads from the retrieved URL content.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:19 AM