ask-add-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (MEDIUM): The Python adapter templates provided in
README.mdandSKILL.mdare vulnerable to path traversal. Theget_target_pathmethod uses thenamefield from a skill dictionary directly to construct a filesystem path without sanitization. - Evidence (README.md):
skill_name = name or skill.get("name", "unknown")followed byreturn self.target_dir / skill_name / "SKILL.md". If an attacker-controlled skill provides a name like../../.ssh/authorized_keys, the adapter would attempt to write to that path relative to the home directory. - Capability Inventory: The templates are designed to facilitate file-writing operations to sensitive locations like
Path.home()andPath.cwd(). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the
skill_namevariable is present in the templates. - [Persistence Mechanisms] (LOW): The skill documentation describes how to write configuration and rules to global user directories (e.g.,
~/.cursor/rules). While this is the intended purpose of the tool, it represents a sensitive capability that could be abused to maintain persistence if combined with malicious content.
Audit Metadata