ask-skill-creator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface because it is designed to autonomously generate new skill files and update documentation based on untrusted user input.
  • Ingestion points: User requests defining the purpose, name, and instructions for a new skill are ingested as context for the agent's file generation tasks.
  • Boundary markers: The protocol lacks explicit delimiters or specific instructions to sanitize user input or prevent the agent from executing instructions that may be embedded within the provided skill description.
  • Capability inventory: The skill directs the agent to perform file system operations, including creating new directories and writing files (SKILL.md, skill.yaml, README.md), as well as modifying the repository's root README.md.
  • Sanitization: While naming conventions restrict the skill name to a safe character set (kebab-case), the content of the generated files is not validated, potentially allowing for the propagation of malicious instructions into the repository.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation references a command-line tool named ask for administrative functions such as creating, copying, and syncing skills, which implies the execution of local system commands to manage the repository environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 7, 2026, 08:07 AM