create-video-start
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The rules in
rules/claude-cli-patterns.mdrecommend granting theBashtool to multiple skill components (e.g.,motion-designer,remotion-scaffold). This allows the agent to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill uses
cat << EOF(unquoted HEREDOC) to construct prompts and scripts. This pattern performs shell expansion on variables like$SPEC_CONTENT, which contains AI-generated text. If the AI-generated content includes shell metacharacters like backticks or$(...), the shell will execute them during interpolation. - CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (MEDIUM):
rules/claude-cli-patterns.mddocuments the practice of exportingANTHROPIC_API_KEYinto the environment where the agent operates. While necessary for the CLI, the combination with theBashtool allows a compromised prompt to exfiltrate the key via simple network commands. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). Evidence: 1. Ingestion points: Untrusted user input enters via the 'Creative Brief' and propagates through
VIDEO_SPEC.md. 2. Boundary markers: Missing; variables are interpolated directly into prompts with only simple text labels. 3. Capability inventory: Extensive capabilities includingBash,Write, andWebSearch. 4. Sanitization: No validation or escaping of AI-generated content is performed before it is used in subsequent shell operations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata