zotero-rag

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install the mcp-zotero package (with rag and ocr extras) using the uv tool. This package originates from a source that is not included in the pre-defined list of trusted organizations or well-known services.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is directed to execute shell commands to verify existing installations (uv tool list | grep mcp-zotero) and to install or upgrade software components.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The setup workflow involves requesting the user's Zotero Library ID and local API key (ZOTERO_LOCAL_KEY). These sensitive credentials are subsequently written to a local .mcp.json file. While intended for local operation, the handling of secrets through an automated agent setup process requires user caution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) by indexing PDF documents. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in documents could influence the agent's behavior during search tasks.
  • Ingestion points: PDF files retrieved from the user's Zotero storage directory (typically ~/Zotero/storage).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content when processing text chunks from search results.
  • Capability inventory: The system includes tools for indexing libraries, performing semantic searches, expanding text context, and finding similar document chunks.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the text extracted from PDFs before it is presented to the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 4, 2026, 04:22 PM