neldivad-blueprint-instantiator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow in
SKILL.md(Phase 2.5) explicitly instructs the agent to search for and install external skills using the commandnpx skills add <owner/repo@skill> -g -y. This allows for the dynamic installation and execution of arbitrary code from remote repositories on the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches tools and configuration from the
vercel-labsorganization on GitHub. This is documented as a neutral operation as the source is a well-known and trusted service provider. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an architecture that processes untrusted user input (SaaS project ideas and requirements) and interpolates it into persistent system-level documentation such as
.cursorrulesandCLAUDE.md. These files are intended to guide the behavior of AI agents in subsequent sessions, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection if a user provides malicious instructions during the setup phase. - Ingestion points: User responses collected during the Phase 1 Q&A script (
01-qna-script.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; user input is directly inserted into template placeholders like
{{PROJECT_NAME}}and{{ONE_LINER}}. - Capability inventory: The skill performs file writing, installs external packages/skills, and executes shell commands for project initialization.
- Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or "ignore instructions" delimiters for external content was found in the templates.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to manage project state and dependencies, including
npx skills add,npm run, and database migration commands. The use of the-yflag in installation commands bypasses user confirmation prompts during the automated workflow.
Audit Metadata