mcp-builder

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The SKILL.md instructions direct the agent to fetch documentation and SDK READMEs from modelcontextprotocol.io and raw.githubusercontent.com/modelcontextprotocol. These domains and organizations are not included in the 'Trusted External Sources' whitelist, making them unverifiable.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The file scripts/connections.py contains the MCPConnectionStdio class which uses mcp.client.stdio.stdio_client. This function spawns a subprocess using a provided command and args. If these parameters are derived from untrusted input (e.g., from fetched documentation or user prompts), it could lead to arbitrary command execution.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill guides the user/agent to run npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector in Phase 3. This command downloads and executes code from the npm registry at runtime.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md explicitly instructs the agent to use WebFetch to load external documentation from modelcontextprotocol.io and GitHub.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to treat the fetched content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (connections.py) and perform network operations.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization logic is present to filter or validate the content retrieved from external URLs before it influences agent behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:49 PM