mermaid-tools

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Privilege Escalation (HIGH): The documentation in references/setup_and_troubleshooting.md instructs the user or agent to execute commands with sudo privileges to modify system package repositories and install software.
  • Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The setup instructions include a piped remote execution pattern (wget ... | sudo apt-key add -) which downloads a key from a remote URL and immediately executes a command with it.
  • External Downloads (LOW): The skill relies on external software including google-chrome-stable and @mermaid-js/mermaid-cli. Per the [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], these are from trusted sources (Google), which downgrades the download severity to LOW.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted markdown content.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/extract_diagrams.py reads content from a user-supplied markdown file.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the script identifies content using standard markdown code block regex without delimiters or ignore-instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write files to the disk and execute external binaries via extract-and-generate.sh.
  • Sanitization: While output filenames are sanitized, the content of the diagram is passed directly to the mmdc renderer without sanitization.
  • Security Control Deactivation (MEDIUM): The scripts/puppeteer-config.json file explicitly disables the Chrome sandbox (--no-sandbox, --disable-setuid-sandbox), significantly reducing the security profile of the rendering environment.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 23, 2026, 05:28 AM