astro-cta-injector

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): Vulnerability to Indirect Prompt Injection. The skill ingests untrusted blog content (Astro/Markdown) and displays it to the agent via scripts/preview_injection.py without sanitization or boundary markers. Malicious instructions embedded in blog posts could hijack the agent's behavior during the injection process. Evidence: Ingestion point is scripts/preview_injection.py via open().read(); Boundary markers and sanitization are absent; Capability includes file system modification via inject_ctas.py.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): Core scripts score_posts.py and inject_ctas.py are referenced in the workflow but their source code is missing. Their absence prevents verification of the file-modification logic and claimed safety features like backups and rollbacks.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill uses brittle dynamic path manipulation (sys.path.insert) to import modules from a directory four levels above the skill root. These dependencies (config_loader, utils) are external and unverifiable.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 11:38 PM