shioaji
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (CRITICAL): File
PREPARE.mdinstructs users to install theuvtool using piped remote scripts:curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shandpowershell -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex". Source:astral.sh(Untrusted/Unknown). Execution method: Piped shell execution. This is a critical vulnerability that allows unverified code to run directly on the host system. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill documentation encourages the use of system commands for package management (
pip install,uv add) and repository cloning (git clone). These provide powerful primitives that an attacker could abuse via prompt injection to execute arbitrary code. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill downloads the
shioajilibrary and clones an external repository (Sinotrade/sj-trading-demo). These sources are not included in the Trusted External Sources whitelist and thus represent unverifiable dependencies. - PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): Vulnerability to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). The skill ingests untrusted market data and has high-stakes trading capabilities. Ingestion points: Market quotes and contract data are ingested via
api.quote.subscribeandapi.Contracts. Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore commands embedded in financial data. Capability inventory: The skill can place, modify, and cancel financial orders viaapi.place_order,api.update_order, andapi.cancel_order. Sanitization: Absent; external data is processed and used to inform trading decisions without filtering.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata