youtube-transcript

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Natural language instruction to download and install from URL detected (CI009) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill is coherent and its capabilities match the stated purpose (downloading transcripts and local transcription). It performs local downloads via yt-dlp and optionally installs and runs Whisper for transcription. I found no signs of covert data exfiltration, credential harvesting, obfuscation, or malicious behavior. The main supply-chain concern is the normal risk of installing third-party packages (pip/apt/homebrew) without version pinning or checksum verification — acceptable if the user reviews and consents. Overall, the skill appears benign but should be run only by users who accept the normal risks of installing packages from public registries and who review prompts before consenting to installs or large downloads. LLM verification: The document describes a legitimate YouTube-transcript downloader/transcriber workflow. I found no explicit malicious code, hardcoded credentials, or hidden network destinations. Main security concerns are operational and supply-chain: unpinned pip installs, use of shell command substitution without sanitization (risk of command injection or unsafe filenames), and no recommendations for installing/verifying third-party tools in isolated environments. If executed automatically or by an unprivileg