internal-comms

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of ingesting and summarizing untrusted data from multiple external channels. * Ingestion points: Files examples/3p-updates.md, examples/company-newsletter.md, and examples/faq-answers.md instruct the agent to retrieve and process data from Slack, Google Drive, Email, Calendar, and external press. * Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) or system-level warnings to distinguish between the skill's primary instructions and the untrusted content retrieved from external sources. * Capability inventory: The skill contains no executable scripts (Python/Node.js). It relies on the host agent's native tool capabilities to read from corporate APIs and external websites. * Sanitization: None. There are no instructions provided to the agent to escape, filter, or validate the content retrieved from external sources before processing it.
  • [NO_CODE]: The skill consists entirely of Markdown instruction files and does not include any executable scripts, binaries, or configuration files that trigger command execution or dynamic code evaluation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 28, 2026, 04:03 PM