gitops-workflows

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution (HIGH): In references/flux-implementation.md, the command curl -s https://fluxcd.io/install.sh | sudo bash downloads and executes a script with root privileges from the non-whitelisted domain fluxcd.io. This is downgraded from CRITICAL as it is the primary installation method for the skill's core functionality.
  • Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution (MEDIUM): The skill frequently applies manifests from untrusted (non-whitelisted) GitHub repositories, which could contain malicious resource definitions. Examples include ArgoCD (argoproj repository), Flagger (fluxcd repository), and Sealed Secrets (bitnami-labs repository).
  • Privilege Escalation (HIGH): The Flux installer script is executed with sudo, granting full administrative access to an unverified external resource.
  • Data Exposure & Exfiltration (LOW): references/argocd-implementation.md provides instructions to retrieve and decode the initial ArgoCD admin password from a cluster secret. While necessary for initial setup, this involves handling plain-text credentials.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill establishes an attack surface where the agent acts on instructions/manifests fetched from external Git repositories.
  • Ingestion points: repoURL in ArgoCD Applications and url in Flux GitRepository resources across multiple reference files.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; fetched configurations are applied without delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" headers.
  • Capability inventory: kubectl apply, kubectl patch, flux bootstrap, and git push operations.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not include validation or sanitization of the remote manifests before application.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:05 PM