esphome-config-helper
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The validate-config.sh script executes the esphome command as a subprocess. While it uses proper shell quoting for the filename argument to prevent basic command injection, the script's core purpose is to invoke a complex tool that processes user-provided YAML files.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The configuration templates use string interpolation (e.g., ${friendly_name}) within C++ lambda blocks. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where unsanitized user input could lead to arbitrary C++ code being injected into the firmware during compilation. Evidence: Ingestion points: substitution variables in YAML templates; Boundary markers: C++ string literals; Capability inventory: C++ firmware compilation and execution; Sanitization: Absent in the provided templates.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The display-node.yaml template references Google Fonts (gfonts://), which is a trusted external source. The skill also relies on the esphome Python package, a standard dependency for this use case.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (SAFE): The skill correctly implements the !secret directive for WiFi credentials, API encryption keys, and OTA passwords, ensuring that no sensitive data is hardcoded within the configuration files.
Audit Metadata