agentmail
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the
agentmail-mcppackage from the npm registry and themcplibrary from PyPI. These are expected dependencies for the integrated service integration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructs the user to execute
npx -y agentmail-mcpandpip install mcpto set up the environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes external data from incoming emails.
- Ingestion points: Incoming email content retrieved via the
get_threadandlist_threadstools documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions for the agent to treat email content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to send emails, reply to threads, create/delete inboxes, and download attachments.
- Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or filtering of incoming email content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata