faiss

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The LangChain integration example in 'SKILL.md' includes the configuration allow_dangerous_deserialization=True when calling FAISS.load_local(). This parameter bypasses security checks and allows the underlying pickle library to execute arbitrary Python code that may be embedded in a malicious index file.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: By encouraging the use of unsafe deserialization flags, the skill creates a path for system command execution if the agent is instructed to load a vector index from an untrusted or compromised source.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted vector data into the agent's context without adequate sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: 'SKILL.md' and 'references/index_types.md' use functions like faiss.read_index and FAISS.load_local to import data from external files.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions or examples defining delimiters to separate ingested data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read from the file system and perform similarity searches that influence agent responses.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization logic is provided, and security warnings for deserialization are explicitly disabled in the code examples.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 4, 2026, 05:50 PM