mcporter
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands through the
--stdioflag (e.g.,mcporter list --stdio "..."andmcporter call --stdio "..."). If an attacker can influence the command string passed to these flags, it leads to direct command injection. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
npxto run themcporterpackage without installation and encourages the use ofnpxto run remote MCP servers (e.g.,@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem). Additionally, thegenerate-clicommand creates executable wrappers from remote URLs, which could introduce untrusted code into the local environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The tool is designed to connect to and fetch data from arbitrary MCP servers via HTTP URLs (e.g.,
mcporter list --http-url https://some-mcp-server.com). This could be used to interact with malicious endpoints or exfiltrate data processed by the agent. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes commands to manage and retrieve configuration keys (
mcporter config get <key>) and perform OAuth authentication. These capabilities could be abused to expose or exfiltrate sensitive credentials and configuration data if the agent is prompted to do so by a malicious source. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external MCP servers and tools which acts as an ingestion point for untrusted content.
- Ingestion points: Outputs from
mcporter call(HTTP or stdio) and server discovery data. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat MCP tool outputs as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: Extensive; includes shell command execution via
--stdio, network access via--http-url, and local configuration modification. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or filtering of content returned from MCP servers before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata