monitor-ci

[Skill Scanner] Backtick command substitution detected All findings: [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This is an orchestration skill for monitoring Nx Cloud CI and applying self-healing fixes. The documented capabilities are coherent with its stated purpose: it needs repository reads, can run local verification, and can apply fixes either via the Nx Cloud control plane (MCP) or locally and push. There is no explicit malicious code or obfuscated payload in this document. However, the skill exercises high-impact actions (running installs, applying patches, committing and pushing code, and calling an external MCP) while leaving critical trust boundaries unspecified (MCP and subagent endpoints, authentication). Because of those unspecified external interactions and the power to modify and push repository code, this skill presents a meaningful supply-chain risk unless the control plane and subagent implementations are verified and trusted. I classify it as SUSPICIOUS/vulnerable: acceptable if used only with trusted Nx Cloud infrastructure and audited agent binaries; otherwise it carries non-trivial risk of accidental or malicious code changes and credential forwarding. LLM verification: This SKILL.md is coherent: its declared purpose aligns with the capabilities described (monitoring Nx Cloud CI and applying self-healing fixes). There is no clear evidence of hidden malware or data-exfiltration routines. However, the skill enables high-impact autonomous actions (committing/pushing changes, applying patches locally, calling MCP apply/reject/rerun) and running package installs and task commands — all without strict, per-action user consent by default. That makes the skill potentia