vault-synthesis

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is designed to read, interpret, and aggregate content from various vault notes (e.g., daily logs, project notes) to create summaries and 'History' notes. This creates a significant attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: Uses obsidian-cli search-content and rg to find and read notes from directories like 01-Days and 03-Records (referenced in history-rollup.md and topic-note.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from obeying instructions found inside the notes it analyzes.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (obsidian-cli, rg), create new files (obsidian-cli create), and modify existing YAML frontmatter. A malicious note could contain instructions that hijack these capabilities.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The workflow encourages 'context-aware' extraction of narrative content, which increases the likelihood of an agent obeying embedded instructions.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on executing external shell commands to perform its duties. While these are intended for vault management, they represent a risk if command arguments are derived from untrusted note content.
  • Evidence: References to rg (ripgrep) and obsidian-cli in history-rollup.md and topic-note.md for searching and creating files.
  • [Data Exposure] (LOW): The skill is designed to search through personal notes in a vault. While this is its stated purpose, it facilitates broad access to sensitive information stored within the notes, which could be exfiltrated if combined with a prompt injection or network-enabled tool.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:01 PM