mcp-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
MCPConnectionStdioclass enables the execution of arbitrary system commands through the MCP standard input/output transport. - Evidence: Found in
scripts/connections.pywithin the_create_contextmethod:stdio_client(StdioServerParameters(command=self.command, args=self.args, env=self.env)). - Risk: If the
commandorargsare dynamically populated from user-controlled data or untrusted LLM output, it leads to arbitrary command injection on the host system. The severity is lowered to MEDIUM as this is the primary intended function of an MCP stdio connector. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The skill provides mechanisms to connect to remote servers via HTTP and Server-Sent Events (SSE).
- Evidence: Found in
scripts/connections.pyviaMCPConnectionSSEandMCPConnectionHTTPclasses which utilizesse_client(url=self.url)andstreamablehttp_client(url=self.url). - Risk: Enables network communication with arbitrary endpoints, which could be used for data exfiltration or connecting to malicious MCP servers that provide harmful tool definitions.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via tool output.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/connections.pyvia thecall_toolmethod which returnsresult.contentfrom external MCP servers. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat MCP tool output as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute local subprocesses and perform network operations.
- Sanitization: Absent. The content returned from external servers is passed back to the agent without filtering or validation.
Audit Metadata