industry-pe-ratios
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Remote Code Execution] (CRITICAL): In
references/mcp-setup.md, the skill instructs the user to execute a remote script directly into the shell usingcurl -fsSL ... | bash. This is a high-risk pattern that allows for arbitrary code execution from a remote source that is not within the provided trusted scope. - [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on the
octagon-mcppackage vianpx. This is an external dependency from an unverified source (OctagonAI) which is executed at runtime to facilitate the MCP server connection. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (MEDIUM): The
SKILL.mdfile defines a workflow where user-controlled parameters such as<INDUSTRY>and<EXCHANGE>are interpolated directly into a natural language prompt passed to theoctagon-agenttool. - Ingestion points: User parameters defined in
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdare used to build the tool argument. - Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or instructions are used to separate user data from the system's command instructions.
- Capability inventory: The target
octagon-agenttool has broad capabilities including web search and SEC filing retrieval, which could be abused if the prompt is manipulated. - Sanitization: None. The input is treated as trusted and directly concatenated into the tool's execution prompt.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata