sec-8k-analysis
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The setup instructions in
references/mcp-setup.mdpromote executing a remote script from an unverified source (Homebrew/install) directly in the shell using thecurl | bashpattern:/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)". This allows for arbitrary code execution from a third-party source not listed in the trusted organizations.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill relies onnpxto download and executeoctagon-mcpand askillsmanager from theOctagonAIGitHub account at runtime. Neither the package nor the organization is on the verified trusted list, posing a supply-chain risk.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The skill processes untrusted external data (SEC 8-K filings), creating a vulnerability to Indirect Prompt Injection. \n - Ingestion points: Filing data enters the agent context via the
octagon-agenttool call defined inSKILL.md. \n - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt workflow to distinguish instructions from data. \n
- Capability inventory: The agent uses the filing content to generate material event summaries and corporate change assessments, directly influencing the user's reasoning. \n
- Sanitization: No validation or instruction-filtering for filing content is defined in the workflow.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata