gitlab
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and displays external data (issue descriptions, merge request titles/bodies) fetched from GitLab. This content is considered untrusted as it can be controlled by any user with access to the repository.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/gitlab.pyscript fetches data usingglaband renders it viaformat_issue_summaryandformat_mr_summaryfunctions. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded within the fetched GitLab content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute
glabcommands, including creating issues, merging code, and triggering CI/CD pipelines. - Sanitization: The script performs minimal formatting (stripping whitespace) but does not sanitize or escape the content to prevent it from being interpreted as instructions by the model.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In the
references/common-workflows.mdfile, there is an example workflow that usescurlto send CI failure notifications to a Slack webhook (https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK/URL). While this is a common automation pattern, it demonstrates a network exfiltration path for data derived from the GitLab environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill relies on executing the
glabCLI through thesubprocess.runmethod inscripts/gitlab.py. While the arguments are passed as a list to mitigate shell injection, the skill essentially provides the agent with full access to the localglabinstallation's capabilities.
Audit Metadata