command-creator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/main.cjs modifies JavaScript routing tables by directly interpolating the skill argument into a single-quoted string within a configuration file. Because the input is not escaped, it allows for property injection or arbitrary code execution when the agent loads its routing configuration.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill specifies a mandatory research phase using WebFetch to query the arXiv API and utilizing the Exa search tool. These operations target well-known academic and technology services.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by placing unsanitized user input into generated command files and catalogs.
  • Ingestion points: Arguments name, skill, and description are accepted as user input and processed in scripts/main.cjs.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. Generated command files do not use delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the description field.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes fs.writeFileSync and fs.appendFileSync to modify command definitions, discovery catalogs, and internal routing tables.
  • Sanitization: Only the name parameter is sanitized via regex; the skill and description parameters are only trimmed, allowing potentially malicious instructions to persist in generated files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs file system modifications on internal agent directories (.claude/) to update discovery catalogs and intent routing logic, which determines how the framework interprets and executes user commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 7, 2026, 12:38 AM