context-compressor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands via Python subprocesses and Node.js spawn operations. Specifically, it calls 'python' and 'pnpm' in 'scripts/main.cjs' to perform codebase searches and compression tasks. The bundled reference scripts in 'references/skill-creator-reference/' also execute 'claude -p' to run evaluations and optimizations, and 'lsof' to manage local network ports.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, such as RAG payloads and user-provided codebases.
- Ingestion points: External text and JSON files are read in 'scripts/compress_context.py' and 'scripts/run_skill_workflow.py'.
- Boundary markers: The compression engine does not automatically wrap its output in security delimiters (e.g., XML tags or clear boundaries) to separate processed untrusted content from the rest of the agent's prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment permits 'Bash', 'Write', and 'Read' operations, which could be abused if malicious instructions in the compressed context are followed by the agent.
- Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of the input text to remove potential injection strings, as the tool's purpose is to preserve evidence.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'references/skill-creator-reference/eval-viewer/generate_review.py' script starts a local web server (HTTPServer) on 127.0.0.1 to provide a graphical interface for reviewing evaluation results. While this is a local-only service, it represents a runtime network surface for data visualization.
- [SAFE]: Metadata in 'SKILL.md' includes fields like 'verified: true' and 'lastVerifiedAt'. While these might be interpreted as official platform safety claims, they are treated as non-authoritative data in this analysis.
Audit Metadata