debug-log-analysis
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute Bash commands including
cp,node,wc, andgrepto manipulate and search log files.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive debug logs located atC:\Users\{user}\.claude\debug\and temporary project directories. These logs include full conversation history, prompt content, and tool execution details. While the workflow currently involves local copying, it elevates sensitive system data into the agent's active context.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and interprets external data from debug logs.\n - Ingestion points: Debug log files (
.txt) and reduced outputs are read in full into the agent's context (SKILL.md Step 3 and 5).\n - Boundary markers: None; there are no delimiters or instructions to treat log content as untrusted data.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent maintains access to
Bash,Read, andWritetools while processing the logs, allowing for potential tool abuse if malicious instructions are encountered in the logs.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of log content sanitization or validation before the agent parses the data.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external scripts such as
scripts/reduce-debug-log.mjsandunified-creator-guard.cjsthat are not part of the provided skill bundle. These represent unverifiable dependencies that the agent is instructed to execute vianode.
Audit Metadata