docker-compose
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/main.cjsfile useschild_process.spawnto execute the localdockerbinary. It passes command-line arguments directly from the agent to thedocker composecommand, granting the agent full control over the local Docker daemon. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides tools like
execandrunwhich are explicitly designed to execute arbitrary code and commands inside running or new containers. This is a high-capability feature that can be used to manipulate containerized environments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through the
logstool. - Ingestion points: Container output and application logs are read into the agent's context.
- Boundary markers: None are implemented to distinguish container output from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute further Docker commands based on the logs it reads.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of log content is performed before processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references installation resources from official Docker domains (docs.docker.com), which are recognized as trusted sources for development tooling.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: There is a discrepancy between the
SKILL.md'Safety Features' section and the actual implementation. The documentation claims that destructive commands likerm -rfor root-level execution are 'BLOCKED' or require confirmation, but thescripts/main.cjsfile contains no logic to validate or intercept these commands before execution.
Audit Metadata