enhance-prompt

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains misleading metadata regarding its authorship and origin. Evidence: The metadata in SKILL.md attributes the skill to google-labs-code and the source to google-labs-code/stitch-skills. However, the author context identifies the actual author as oimiragieo. This impersonation of a trusted organization (Google) is a deceptive practice that could cause users to misjudge the skill's safety and authority.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: The enhancement pipeline reads project-level configuration files such as DESIGN.md, docs/design-system.md, and tailwind.config.ts, as well as raw user requests. Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data are present in the enhancement steps. Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Read and Write tools, allowing the agent to access filesystem content and record data to a memory directory. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from external files before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 3, 2026, 09:05 AM