github-ops
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
- Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes a "Memory Protocol" that instructs the agent to read and write
.claude/context/memory/*files and to "assume interruption," which are hidden/persistent behavior directives unrelated to the stated GitHub CLI reconnaissance purpose and thus constitute a deceptive instruction injection.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly uses the GitHub CLI to list, search, and fetch repository files (e.g., "gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/contents" and "gh search code" in SKILL.md and the implementation template), which pulls arbitrary public, user-generated GitHub content that the agent is instructed to read and use to determine subsequent actions.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill executes gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/contents/{path} (i.e., https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/contents/{path}) at runtime and explicitly mandates reading .claude/context/memory/learnings.md before starting, meaning fetched repository content can directly control agent prompts/memory and is a required dependency.
Audit Metadata