jira-pm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection due to the way it handles external data.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through
search,get-issue, andget-commentstools which fetch content from external Jira instances. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or specific directives to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the retrieved Jira content.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to use
Bash,Read, andWebFetchtools as defined in theSKILL.mdmetadata. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the Jira content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frontmatter in
SKILL.mdexplicitly requests theBashtool. This allows for the execution of arbitrary shell commands, which presents a significant capability that could be misused if the agent is successfully influenced by malicious instructions found in Jira data.
Audit Metadata