kubernetes-flux

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Mar 6, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

  • Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill includes a "Memory Protocol (MANDATORY)" telling the agent to read/write an internal .claude/context/memory file and to "ASSUME INTERRUPTION," which are instructions that alter agent memory/behavior and are unrelated to the Kubernetes management purpose.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The SKILL.md explicitly directs using Flux with arbitrary Git repositories (e.g., "flux bootstrap git --url=…", "flux get sources git", "flux tree kustomization") so the agent/Flux will fetch and interpret manifests from external user-controlled Git sources which can directly influence reconciles and subsequent actions.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

  • Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's installation steps instruct running a remote install script that will be fetched and executed (e.g., "curl -s https://fluxcd.io/install.sh | sudo bash"), which executes external code and is presented as the recommended install method for the required Flux CLI.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill's installation instructions explicitly include a curl ... | sudo bash command that requests sudo privileges and would modify the host system, so it encourages actions that can compromise the machine state.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Mar 6, 2026, 09:21 AM