memory-search

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions in SKILL.md direct the agent to use the Bash tool to execute a Node.js script with an interpolated search query: node .claude/lib/memory/memory-search.cjs "your query". This pattern is vulnerable to shell injection. If an agent-generated or user-influenced query contains shell metacharacters (such as backticks, semicolons, or dollar signs), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system despite the use of double quotes.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates Indirect Prompt Injection by retrieving data from potentially untrusted memory files and presenting it as authoritative context for the agent to follow.
  • Ingestion points: Data is read from files in .claude/context/memory/, including learnings.md, decisions.md, issues.md, gotchas.json, and patterns.json.
  • Boundary markers: The search results are presented with source file names and similarity scores, but the content previews lack delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is equipped with the Bash tool and instructed to "follow [the results] exactly as presented."
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the retrieved content before it is injected into the agent's prompt context.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and executes code from paths outside its own package structure, specifically ../../../../.claude/tools/observability/send-event.cjs and .claude/lib/memory/memory-search.cjs. Relying on files deep in the parent directory structure assumes a specific environment layout and could lead to the execution of unintended or malicious files if the environment is not strictly controlled.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 3, 2026, 09:27 AM